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We take for granted here th at virtual quantity implies no imperfection. I t is therefore plain th at if the notion of measure did not apply to such quantity, the cause of this lim itation could be no other than the nature of measure itself. Yet, even if measure implied no imperfection on the part of measure itself, it m ight bespeak imperfection on the part of the measured, as in the case of creation: for creation designates perfection pure and simple on the part of the Creator, but it does im ply imperfection on the part of the creature. If, then, the notion of measure applies to E ternity with respect to itself, to be measured must not im ply any imperfection. And this is precisely the point John of St. Thomas brings out so forcefully.
That measure as such connotes no imperfection on the part of the measure itself is clear even in the case of predicamental quantity. For to be one and indivisible, to be uniform and manifestative involves only perfection. Yet, that is what is essential to the measure:
For everywhere we seek as the measure something one and in d iv isib le .. . Now where it is thought impossible to take away or to add, there the measure is exact (hence th at of number is most exact; for we posit the un it as indivisible in every respect); b ut in all other cases we im itate this sort of m easure.. . so th at the first thing from which, as far as our perception goes, nothing can be subtracted, all men make the measure.1
Hence the real problem we are faced with is whether measure supposes imperfection on the part of the measured.
Saying, as we well may, th at Eternity is the uniform ity of divine duration, we suppose that duration is essential to Eternity and th at the uniformity in question w ill be a uniform ity of duration. T hat duration as such connotes no imperfection we im plicitly acknowledge by adm itting th at Eternity measures all created durations. For the measure must be of the genus of the measured, as St. Thomas explains: "Since to each thing corresponds a proper measure, it is necessary th a t the essential difference of the measure itself be received according to the condition of the act of the measured."2 Thus, when we say th a t Eternity is infinitely greater than any created duration we suppose th at there is a comparability between Eternity and created durations. This comparability supposes in turn a unity of genus.
But it will become even clearer to us th a t duration as such implies no imperfection if we recall th at a being is said to be perfect and to have being to the extent that it endures. As John of St. Thomas says:
Duration, in virtue of its proper and precise formal notion does not formally im ply succession and quantity. Rather formal succession diminishes the perfection of duration. A thing is said to endure as long as it remains in being; when it loses being it loses duration. Therefore, the less being it loses the more perfectly it endures. Succession, however, implies a certain loss of being in so far as something does not persist in the same manner, and is not in act b u t passes from potency to act. There fore, succession does not belong to the concept of duration, but rather diminishes the notion of duration and makes it less perfect.3 I t follows that if measure were to be excluded from Eternity considered in itself, this could not be because it is measure in the genus of duration, b u t because measure would connote a potentiality on the part of the measur-ed. We are thus confronted with the nature of the distinction between measure and measured. Since measure is defined as " th a t by which quantity is known," it seems th at th at which is made known by it must involve some potentiality, a t least in the order of knowability. B ut divine duration implies no potentiality; indeed, it is identical with its uniform ity: wherefore the distinction which is essential to the very notion of measure would seem to be superfluous. I t is in this context th a t John of St. Thomas makes a distinct con tribution to the analysis of the concept of measure itself. First, he brings out the distinction found in St. Thomas between intrinsic and extrinsic measure: Measure is twofold: one is intrinsic, which is in the measured as an accident is in its subject; this is multiplied according to the multiplicity of the things measured, just as there are many lines which measure the length of many equal bodies. There is also an extrinsic measure, and this is not necessarily multiplied according to the mul tiplicity of the things measured, but is in one thing as in a subject according to which many other things are measured, just as many pieces of cloth are measured according to the length of one ell. . . 1 A body... is measured by an intrinsic measure, such as a line, a surface, or a depth; and by an extrinsic measure, as the thing located is measured by place, movement by time, and cloth by the ell.2
This distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic measure is further developed by John of St. Thomas in the following passage: Extrinsic measure is that which measures something outside itself; and hence it is said to measure by an application to, or by containing that which is measured, as the duration and movement of the heaven measures inferior movements as their extrinsic measure, and as the inch measures a length, and the pound a weight. Hence, such a measure terminates the real relation of the thing measured. Intrinsic measure is that measure which is inherent in the thing measured: it does not measure by applic ation but by information. It has, therefore, the perfection of measure although it does not have the real relation and imperfection of dependence in virtue of which the measured thing depends upon its measure. Time is one example of this: although it is an extrinsic measure in regard to us, nevertheless it measures intrinsically the move ment of the heaven; nor is there a superior time by which this time is measured. For, in every genus, the most perfect is the measure both of itself and of the other things in that genus -the intrinsic measure of itself, and the extrinsic measure of the other things.3 I f Eternity is the measure of divine duration, it can only be intrinsic measure. B ut intrinsic measure is still formally distinct from the intrin sically measured. Hence it remains to be shown th a t even the intrin sically "measured" involves no imperfection. This John of St. Thomas achieves by the following demonstration. The measurable is measurable to the extent of its assimilability to the measure. B u t if the measurable is perfectly assimilable to the measure it is so precisely because of its perfec tion. Again, the essence of measure does not consist in m aking known th a t which in itself is only imperfectly knowable b u t simply in making 1 In I I Sent., d.2, q .l, a.2, ad 1. 2 Quaestio disputata de Veriiate, q .l, a.5, c. 3 Op. cit., disp. 9, a .l, n.14 -Time is that movement in the universe, which is the measure of all other movements by reason of its speed and uniform ity. The Ancients identified time w ith the "diurnal movement of the outer sphere." Our practical standard for measuring time is actually still the same: the sidereal day based upon the rotation of the earth w ith respect to the sphere of stars. This, however, is only an approximation of natural time. The identification of a known constant of nature -such as the speed of light -w ith natural time, w ill probably never be more than a hypothesis. known by virtue of indivisibility and uniformity. Indeed, mensuration consists most formally in making known the perfection of the measurable; hence, if the measured is wholly perfect, it will be perfectly made known. There is no imperfection, either in manifesting perfection, or in one's perfection being manifested.
. . . I t must be noted th at although measure is by its very nature ordered to manifest the formal or virtual quantity of the measured, nevertheless it is not of the nature of measure to do this in an imperfect way, th at is, in the mode of our knowledge which goes from the imperfect to the perfect; on the contrary, the_very nature of mensura tion demands th at the measure make known the measured in a perfect way, that is, by proceeding from the more perfect to the less perfect or less known by us.1
In other words, a measure is measure only in so far as it is actual, and it can manifest only by reason of its actuality and determination. On the other hand, the measured itself is perfect according as it is more assimil ated to the measure. Now, it is not essential to the nature of the measured th a t it be something imperfectly knowable, whose manifestation requires a passage from potency to act. The measured is actually measured and manifested only to the extent th a t it is actually assimilated to the measure. Yet, this actual assimilation, this being conjoined and united to the measure, suppresses neither the concept of measure nor the concept of measured. This is the reason why the notions of measure and measured are compatible with the perfection of Eternity. Indeed, in the latter case, the measured is so perfectly assimilated to its measure th at they are identical. "The more perfect is the measure, the more it is joined to the measured in a perfect way, drawing it to itself as much as possible. Now, since Eternity is the most perfect measure, it is most perfectly joined to that which it properly measures, so much so th at it is identical w ith it." 2 Of course, the " ratio mensurae" and the " ratio mensurati" remain distinct w ithin the identity: otherwise, this identity of perfect assimilation would be devoid of meaning. The main difficulty in this matter arises from the fact th at we attribute to the concept of measure and measured as such the imperfections which adhere to them at the level of things first known and most known by us. Mensuration by application is the one with which we are most fam iliar, as in the case of measuring the length of some body, or the measure of tim e; and though we im plicitly assume the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic measure, it becomes explicit and obvious only after mature consideration.
A further difficulty is raised against measure in Eternity, whose solution is helpful in bringing out the absolute form ality of measure as such. Because measure is manifestative, because the application of measure involves relation, and more particularly because tim e is complete only by an operation of the intellect, it seems th at measure as such -and perhaps even more patently measure in duration -depends in some sense on an act or product of reason. This objection is all the more worthy of considera tion since, as St. Thomas says: " ...T h e nature of E ternity consists in the apprehension [" in apprehensione" ] of the uniform ity of th at which is absolutely outside of movement." 1 Now, although it is true that manifestation is essential to measure, yet, th at by reason of which measure is manifestative, is not something of reason but rather the very unity, indivisibility, uniform ity and determination, by virtue of which it makes known and certifies.
Relation is believed to be essential to measure by such as fail to dis tinguish between internal and external measure. As John of St. Thomas explains:
Formally, measure is not a relation but the foundation of a relation; for some relations are founded in measure, as is said in V Metaph.,2 just as others are founded in action and passion. And just as an action is not constituted formally nor completively by a relation, so neither is measure, although it is the foundation of a relation. Now the difference is th a t -even antecedently to the relation -a distinction between the action and the term produced by it, is of the very nature of action, so th at the same agent cannot both act and produce itself. If , therefore, the Father were identified w ith the Son, the very concept of Father would be destroyed, not only as to the rela tion but even as to the action which is the foundation of th at relation. O n the other hand, measure does not -not even as previous to the relation -im ply an action em itting or producing the measured; actually it involves two things only: th a t it be what is most perfect and most uniform in its genus, and th a t it can be applied and conjoined to, or identified with, the measured by being adequate to it. This ¡pves rise to a relation of the measured to the measure "fundata ex parte mensurati ad mensuram" only when the measure is inferior to, and 'depends upon the measured. Now the first thing -namely to be what is most perfect and most uniform -is quite essential to every measure, whereas the second -the application and conjunc tion to the measured -is not found in the same way in all measures. For some measure by enumeration and succession; others by the highest unity and permanence; some by extrinsic application, others by intrinsic information. And the more perfect the measure, the more perfectly it will be joined to the measured and draw it to itself as far as possible. And thus, since Eternity is the most perfect measure, it is joined to its own measured so completely that it has identity w ith it.3
The difficulty arising from time, the completion of which depends upon intellect, is more easily disposed of. Intellect is required here as a necessary condition, as St. Thomas shows in Book IV of the Physics,4 because of the 'before' and 'after' in time. Unlike the aevum or Eternity, tim e is the measure of a successive, not of a simultaneous, duration: of the 'before' and 'after' in movement. To be adequate to the measure, the 'before' and 'after' must be taken as one. This is achieved only by the intellect; in the thing several parts of tim e cannot be one and simultaneous. And so to measure the whole, some unification and enumeration must be made by the intellect. Eternity, on the contrary, is simultaneously whole, it has all the perfection of measure, and requires no completion by the intellect. In fact, St. Thomas states plainly th at both eviternity and Eternity are complete in the indivisible unity which is their measure and 2 Chap.15, 1020b31; 1021a29. 3 Op. cU., disp.9, a.l, r.22. 4 In I V Phys., lect.23 (ed. L e o n . ) , n.5.
which corresponds to the numbered 'before' and 'after' of time. " Just as the before and after of time complete the notion of time when they are understood as numbered, so does the permanence of the act, when it is understood according to the formality of a one which has the nature of measure, complete the notion of aevum and of E ternity." 1 Thus St. Thomas says th at Eternity is permanence by way of u nity , but tim e by way of enumeration. Hence Eternity does not, as does time, need to be completed by the intellect. John of St. Thomas again develops this at length:
. . . The complete nature of the perfection of measure is found in divine E ternity prior to anything wrought by the intellect. . . The perfection of measure consists in the uniform ity and simplicity by which something is of itself capable of making known a certain quantity, for this is essential to the nature of measure on the part of its per fection, for the most perfect in every genus is the measure of all else in th at genus. Likewise, there is mensuration only on condition th at the measure be adequate to its measured and be simultaneous with it. This is not achieved in time (nor in other measures which measure by numbering) except through the aid of reason, for the parts of measure cannot be joined and numbered except by an act of the intellect. In Eternity, however, this is not required, for it does not measure by enumeration and succession, b ut by possession and by permanent indivisibility in virtue of which it is wholly simultaneous. The full perfection of measure, therefore, is found in Eternity as something real, b u t the lim itation and imperfection of the measured (which are due to its dependence on, and distinction from, the measure) are not found there.
Rather the perfection of measure is plain from the fact that the measured is n ot only adequate to the measure but is identical w ith it.2
As for the passage which some quote from St. Thomas so as to prove that Eternity consists in apprehension and therefore involves something on the part of the intellect, we reply by pointing to the solution of Cajetan: this is not meant in the sense th a t Eternity consists in knowing, as if Eternity had its completion from the soul as does time. He explains more fully by saying th at the unity of uniform ity is actually given w ithout the act of the soul, and that thus the uniform ity does not depend on an act of reason but is something real. According to this interpretation, the passage: " ratio aeternitatis consistit in apprehensione uniformitatis ejus quod est omnino extra m otum ," could be translated as follows: "the nature of Eternity consists in the very concept (or notion) of the uniform ity of th at which is absolutely outside of movement." In other words: the notion of Eternity, and the notion of " the uniform ity of that which" . . . , etc., are identical.3
Thus the concept of measure must be purified of any lim itation attach ing to measure as far as it is realized in inferior things. Impelled to form ul ate more expressly the doctrine of Eternity by the objections and difficulties 1 In I Sent., d.19, q.2, a.l. 2 Op. cit., disp.9, a.l, n.20. 3 " Adverte hic, quod haec propositio in littera posita, scilicet ratio aeternitatis consistit in apprehensione uniformitatis, potest dupliciter exponi, quoad ly in appre hensione. Uno modo, quod significet illam consistere in apprehendi seu cognosci: ita quod aeternitas sit completive ab anima, sicut de tempore dicitur. Et sic, iudicio meo, non intelligitur: eo quod unitas uniformitatis peremiis actu est absque actu animae, non minus quam unitas essentiae divinae. Alio modo, quod significet idem quod in conceptione obiectiva, quam frequenti usu vocamus rationem; ac si dixisset: ratio aeternitatis consistit in apprehensione, idest in ratione uniformitatis. Et hic est sensus intentus." -C a j e t a n , In Iam, q.10, a.l (ed. L e o n . ) , n.4. brought forward by the later Scholastics, John of St. Thomas has set into clear relief the inmost essence of measure and expressed it in its formal purity. In so doing, he has thrown light on the proper nature of Eternity.
Sis t e r M . J o c e l y n , O.P.
